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CONSPIRACIES TO OBSTRUCT JUSTICE IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: DEFINING THE SCOPE
OF SECTION 1985(2)
INTRODUcrION

The Ku Klux Klan was one of the more infamous manifestations of
southern white reluctance to concede political rights to newly freed
slaves following the Civil War.I The Klan attempted to overturn the
Reconstruction policy of Congress 2 through acts of violence and terrorism directed toward blacks, Union sympathizers and government
officials.3 Against a backdrop of threatened anarchy, the forty-second Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act in 18714 to reassert
federal supremacy and to provide a remedy to those injured by civil
rights violations. 5
1. J. Randall & D. Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction 682-83 (rev. 2d
ed. 1969); see Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1334-35 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977); A. McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of
the United States 685-86, 688-89 (Students ed. 1935); 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 158, 159
(1981).
2. Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977); J. Randall & D. Donald, supra note 1, at 682-83; see A.
McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 686, 688-90.
3. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425 (1973); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981); Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353,
1359 (E.D. La. 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1977), revod on othergrounds sub
nom. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 247-48 (1871) (statement of Rep. Kelley) [hereinafter cited as Cong. Globe]; id.
at 320-21 (statement of Rep. Stoughton); id. at 369 (statement of Rep. Sheldon); id.
at 374 (statement of Rep. Lowe); id. at 428 (statement of Rep. Beatty); id. at 436
(statement of Rep. Cobb); J. Randall & D. Donald, supra note 1, at 683; 50 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 158, 159 (1981).
4. Ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Supp. III
1979)). The Act's official title was "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes." Id. It
has also been referred to as the "Ku Klux Act," Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172
(1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 663 (1978), the "Antilynching Act," 1 T. Emerson & D. Haber, Political and
Civil Rights in the United States 19 (2d ed. 1958), the "Act of April 20, 1871,"
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978); 1 T. Emerson & D. Haber,
supra, at 19, the "Civil Rights Act of 1871," Comment, A Construction of Section
1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 402, 402 n.1 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as OriginalPurpose], the "Force Act of 1871," id., and the "third
'force bill.' " Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (quoting J. Randall, The
Civil War and Reconstruction 857 (1937)), overruled on other grounds, Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). This Note will refer to the
statute as the Ku Klux Klan Act.
5. See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 983 (1981); McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 932 (5th
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Section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act is presently codified at section
1985 of Title 42 of the United States Code and contains three subsections.6 Subsection 1 proscribes conspiracies to thwart United States
officials engaged in the discharge of their duties; 7 subsection 2 prohibits conspiracies to obstruct justice in a state or federal court; 8 and

Cir. 1977) (en banc); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 839 (3d Cir. 1976). "Three
facts combine to show the necessity for [the Ku Klux Klan bill]. First, the violence
and lawlessness, for which it is proposed to provide a remedy, occur in many, widely
separated districts; second, the character of the victims selected and the methods of
outrage, indicate a common source and purpose, an organized conspiracy; and,
third, the organization to which they are traced is political in its origin and aims, and
is military in form." Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 412-13 (statement of Rep.
Roberts).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Supp. III 1979). Section 1985 was originally codified with
three subsections, designated as (1), (2) and (3). U.S. Rev. Stat. tit. 24, § 1980, [18
pt. 1] Stat. 347 (2d ed. 1878). In 1976, the subsections were redesignated as (a), (b)
and (c). 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976). Congress reinstituted the numbering of the subsections as (1), (2) and (3) when it again recodified the statute in 1979. 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(Supp. III 1979). As a result, some of the cases and secondary sources cited in this
Note utilize the letter subsection headings. This Note, however, will use the present
numerical designations to identify the subsections of § 1985.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) (Supp. III 1979). Subsection 1 provides: "If two or more
persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or
threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence
under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by like
means any officer of the United States to leave any State, district, or place, where his
duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or
property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while
engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest,
interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties." Id.
8. Id. § 1985(2). Subsection 2 provides: "'Iftwo or more persons in any State or
Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in
any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to an)
matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or
witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or
to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in
any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of an)
verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or
having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of
impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of
justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal
protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or
attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal
protection of the laws." Id. As defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1976), the phrase "court of
the United States" in § 1985(2) refers only to article III courts and certain federal
courts created by act of Congress, but not to state courts. Cartolano v.Tyrrell, 421 F.
Supp. 526, 531 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1370
(E.D. La. 1975), alf'd, 545 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); cf. Seeley v. Brotherhood of
Painters, Decorators & Paper Hangers, 308 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962) (NLRB not a
court of the United States).
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subsection 3 outlaws conspiracies to deprive others of equal protection
of the laws or to interfere with the federal election process.,
Although section 1985 remained dormant for many years after its
enactment, during the past ten years it has generated a wave of

litigation.10 The rediscovery of the Ku Klux Klan Act" followed the

Supreme Court's ruling in 1971 that section 1985(3) reaches private
conspiracies, thus obviating a showing of state action.' 2 Lower fed-

9. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979). Subsection 3 provides: "If two or more
persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the
premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more
persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is
lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner,
toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for
President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to
injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy, in
any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein
do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such
injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators." Id.
10. See Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c): A
Suggested Approach, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 635, 636 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ClassBased Animus]; OriginalPurpose, supra note 4, at 405; 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 158, 161
(1981). The dormancy of many civil rights statutes was probably due to the Supreme
Court's tendency, for many years after their enactment, to construe them narrowly.
Class-BasedAnimus, supra, at 636-37. This included declaring the criminal counterpart to § 1985(3) unconstitutional, United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 641-42
(1882), and imposing a state action requirement in § 1985(3). Collins v. Hardyman,
341 U.S. 651, 661 (1951); OriginalPurpose, supra note 4, at 636-37.
11. Case Comment, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: MeLellan v.
Mississippi Power & Light Co., 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1721, 1721-22 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Private Conspiracies]; see Comment, Private Actions Under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(b) for Conspiraciesto Impede the Due Course of Justice, 27 U. Kan. L. Rev.
621, 622 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Private Actions].
12. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971). In Griffin, the Supreme
Court considered both the literal language and statutory history of § 1985(3) in
concluding that "all indicators .. .point unwaveringly to § 1985(3)'s coverage of
private conspiracies." Id. The provision speaks of conspiracies by "two or more
persons" and of "go[ing] in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another,"
conduct which must include private action. Id. at 96. In addition, the congressional
debates indicate an intent to cover private conspiracies" 'irrespective of the act of the
State.' " Id. at 101 (quoting Cong. Globe, supra note 3, app. at 141 (statement of
Rep. Shanks)). The Court distinguished but did not overrule United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1882), which had struck down the criminal analogue of § 1985(3) as
unconstitutionally regulating private conduct. Id. at 104.
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eral courts have extended this holding to other subsections of section

1985. 13
Modern attempts to apply this ancient and untested law to situations probably unforeseen by the forty-second Congress' 4 have created
problems of statutory construction. Whether Congress intended to
require an intent to deny equal protection throughout the Act has
been.a particularly problematic question.' 5 Specifically, the federal
courts have disagreed on whether the requirement of an "intent to
deny ... equal protection of the law," which expressly appears in the
second clause of section 1985(2) protecting state court proceedings,
also applies to the first clause dealing with federal court proceed13. See, e.g., McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (clause one
of § 1985(2)), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981); Phillips v. International Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 556 F.2d 939, 941 & n.1 (9th Cir.
1977) (clause two of § 1985(2)); Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329,
1339 (7th Cir.) (§'1985(1)), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 975 (1977); Askew v. Bloemker,
548 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 1976) (clause one of § 1985(3)); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535
F.2d 830, 839 (3d Cir. 1976) (clause one of § 1985(2)): Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d
1057, 1061 (8th Cir. 1973) (clause two of § 1985(2)); Local No. 1 (ACA) v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 263, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (same).
14. Plaintiffs attempting to invoke subsection 2 have alleged a variety of fact
patterns: conspiracies by lawyers to represent their clients incompetently, e.g., McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983
(1981); Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 500-01 (10th Cir. 1979), conspiracies by
prosecuting officials to tamper with jurors, e.g., Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d
269, 270 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Bergman v. Stein, 404
F. Supp. 287, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kelly v. Foreman, 384 F. Supp. 1352, 1353 (S.D.
Tex. 1974), conspiracies by prosecuting officials to procure perjured testimony or
conceal exculpatory evidence, e.g., Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 832 (3d Cir.
1976); Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1357 (E.D. La. 1975), affd, 545 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub non. Robertson v. \Vegmann, 436
U.S. 584 (1978), conspiracies to harass parties or witnesses in order to forestall
litigation, e.g., Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir.
1981); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 883 (1972); Kelly v. Foreman, 384 F. Supp. 1352, 1353 (S.D. Tex. 1974), or
conspiracies by employers or unions to blacklist workers who had sued previous
employers. E.g., Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981); Seeley v. Brotherhood of Painters,
Decorators & Paper Hangers, 308 F.2d 52, 55 (5th Cir. 1962).
15. Compare Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1354-55 (9th
Cir. 1981) (clause one of § 1985(2) does not require an equal protection denial), and
McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
983 (1981), and Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1340-42 (7th
Cir.) (§ 1985(1) does not require equal protection denial), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975
(1977), and Paynes v. Lee, 377 F.2d 61, 64 (5th Cir. 1967) (dictum) (voting provision
of § 1985(3) does not require equal protection denial), with Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy,
Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 346-47 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (clause one of § 1985(2) requires equal
protection denial), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981), and Jones v. United States,
536 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977), and
Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 839-40 (8th Cir. 1975) (voting provision of § 1985(3)
requires equal protection denial), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
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ings. 16 Some courts have concluded that the equal protection denial
requirement applies to both clauses, and the absence of equal protec-

tion language in one is not crucial. 17 A better reasoned line of cases
contends that no such requirement is compelled by a provision whose

main purpose is to protect the integrity of the federal judicial system.",
This Note maintains that an intent to deny equal protection is not
required for a cause of action under clause one of section 1985(2). An
examination of the language of the Ku Klux Klan Act and the history
surrounding its passage demonstrates that Congress deliberately attached an equal protection requirement only to those provisions dealing with state institutions. This Note further asserts that such an
interpretation is constitutionally supportable and does not create a
general federal tort law. In conclusion, it emphasizes that acceptance
of the recommended interpretation is in the interests of both the
federal judiciary and the individual claimant.
I.

RECENT COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF

SECTION

1985(2)

Courts construing clause one of subsection 2 have produced different interpretations of its language and legislative history.', In McCord v. Bailey,20 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the absence of equal protection language is sufficient reason
not to apply a discriminatory animus requirement. 2' Moreover, the
court found that an analysis of the legislative history, although unnecessary, supported such a conclusion; 22 the court reasoned that clause
one evinced a congressional desire to protect the integrity of the
16. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 687, 687-88 (1981) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Private Actions, supra note 11, at 625-27; 50 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 158, 161 (1981).
17. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 346-47 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981); see Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269, 271 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
18. Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1981);
McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983
(1981); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir. 1976); accord Kelly v.
Foreman, 384 F. Supp. 1352, 1354-55 (S.D. Tex. 1974). Several courts have stated,
in dictum, that clause one of § 1985(2) does not require an allegation of discriminatory animus. Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 502 (10th Cir. 1979); Stern v. United
States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1341-42 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975
(1977); Phillips v. Fisher, 445 F. Supp. 552, 555 (D. Kan. 1977); Bergman v. Stein,
404 F. Supp. 287, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1370
(E.D. La. 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
19. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
20. 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 687 (1981).
21. Id. at 614-15; accord Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345,
1355 (9th Cir. 1981); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d &30, 840 (3d Cir. 1976).
22. 636 F.2d at 615; accord Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345,
1354-55 (9th Cir. 1981); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1976).
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federal judiciary, and not merely to deter equal protection denials.23
In addition, the congressional debates surrounding passage of the Ku
Klux Klan Act demonstrated that Congress attached equal protection
language to only the broadest provisions of section 1985 to prevent
them from infringing on state sovereignty and creating a general

federal tort law.2 4 As the first clause of section 1985(2) posed no such

constitutional problems, the court concluded that equal protection

language was intentionally not attached.2-

Although the majority in McCord engaged in an independent analy-

sis of the legislative history behind subsection 2, those courts applying
the equal protection limitation to clause one have considered the

Supreme Court's pronouncement in Griffin v. Breckenridge20 control-

ling.2 7 In Griffin, plaintiffs brought suit under subsection 3,8 claim-

23. 636 F.2d at 615; accord Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345,
1354-55 (9th Cir. 1981); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1976).
24. 636 F.2d at 616-17; accord Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d
1345, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
25. 636 F.2d at 617; accord Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345,
1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
26. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
27. Jones v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 168, 173-74 (E.D. Ark. 1975) (Griffin
analysis applicable to clause one of § 1985(2)), afj'd, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); see Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340,
345-47 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Griffin analysis generally applicable to all subsections of
§ 1985), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981). Some courts have indicated, in dictum,
that the animus requirement applies to § 1985(2) in general, e.g., Slavin v. Curry,
574 F.2d 1256, 1262, modified on other grounds per curiam, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir.
1978); McIntosh v. Garofalo, 367 F. Supp. 501, 505 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Phillips v.
Singletary, 350 F. Supp. 297, 302-03 (D.S.C. 1972), or to all actions under § 1985.
E.g., Swietlowich v. County of Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir. 1979); Crowe v.
Lucas, 595 F.2d 985, 990 (5th Cir. 1979); Boulware v. Battaglia, 327 F. Supp. 368,
371 (D. Del. 1971). Courts have uniformly used the discriminatory animus requirement as a limiting device in cases brought under clause two of § 1985(2), because
equal protection language expressly appears in that part. Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d
1256, 1262, modified on other grounds per curiam, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978);
Dacey v. Dorsey, 568 F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978);
Phillips v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 556
F.2d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 536 F.2d 1320,
1322-23 (10th Cir. 1976); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir. 1976);
Phillips v. Fisher, 445 F. Supp. 552, 555 (D. Kan. 1977); Cartolano v. Tyrrell, 421 F.
Supp. 526, 531-32 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Davis v. Sprouse, 405 F. Supp. 45, 47-48 (E.D.
Va. 1975); Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kelly v.
Foreman, 384 F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Kerckhoff v. Kerckhoff, 369 F.
Supp. 1165, 1166 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd mem., 505 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1974); McIntosh v.
Garofalo, 367 F. Supp. 501, 505-06 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Johnston v. National Broadcasting Co., 356 F. Supp. 904, 909-10 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Phillips v. Singletary, 350 F.
Supp. 297, 302-03 (D.S.C. 1972); Boulware v. Battaglia, 327 F. Supp. 368, 371 (D.
Del. 1971); see McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dictum), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981).
28. 403 U.S. at 92. Subsection 3 provides a cause of action for damages to
individuals injured by conspiracies to deprive them of equal protection of the laws.
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ing that two white defendants had conspired to assault them on a
public highway with the intention of preventing them "from seeking
the equal protection of the laws and from enjoying the equal rights,
privileges and immunities of citizens under the laws." ' 2

Focusing on

the statutory language of section 1985(3) and the enacting Congress's
desire to prevent equal protection denials without creating a general
federal tort law, 30 the Supreme Court held the presence of equal
protection language means there must be some racial or class-based
31
discriminatory animus motivating the conspirators' actions.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979), quoted supra note 9. The Fifth Circuit
interpreted Griffin and the "equal protection of the laws" language to mean that a
defendant's conduct, to fall within the statute, must be illegal independent of §
1985(3). McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 5,5 F.2d 919, 925-27 (5th Cir.
1977) (en banc). The court reasoned that private persons can deprive others of equal
protection of the laws only by violating a law already in existence. Id. at 924-26. One
commentator has noted that the McLellan independent illegality requirement is
untenable in light of § 1985(3)'s history and case law. See Private Conspiracies,supra
note 11, at 1724-27. In Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Tex. 1978), the court
found the McLellan independent illegality requirement inapplicable to § 1985(2),
because subsection 2 confers a substantive right to be free from conspiracies to
obstruct justice, regardless of whether they are illegal under state law. Id. at 992 &
n.8. The substantive offense in § 1985(3) is the deprivation of equal protection of the
law. Id. As this Note maintains that the "equal protection of the laws" language does
not refer to clause one of § 1985(2), the McLellan requirement is, therefore, inapplicable to suits under that clause.
29. 403 U.S. at 90.
30. Id. at 101-02.
31. Id. The Griffin Court expressly refrained from deciding what type of class
was sufficient, or whether anything other than racial bias would be actionable under
the first portion of § 1985(3). Id. at 102 n.9. Lower federal courts defining this
animus requirement have produced diverse interpretations. For the most part, courts
have been satisfied if the plaintiff is a member either of a class envisioned by the
framers of the Ku Klux Klan Act, such as race, e.g., Fisher v. Shamburg, 624 F.2d
156, 158 (10th Cir. 1980); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 623 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. granted in part and rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 446 U.S. 754 (1980);
Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1971), or political groups, e.g.,
Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 839-40 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958
(1976); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 911-12 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 930 (1975); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973); Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247, 1249 (3d Cir. 1971), or of a class akin to race, such as
religion, e.g., Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45, 48 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3570 (Jan. 18, 1982); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1059, 1064
(6th Cir. 1973); Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 491 (N.D. Cal. 1978), or gender.
E.g., Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979);
Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522
F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975); Curran v. Portland Super. School Comm., 435 F.
Supp. 1063, 1085 (D. Me. 1977). Courts adhering to a strict interpretation of the
Griffin requirement have denied relief under § 1985(3) to a number of classes.
Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 347 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (persons
having filed personal injury or worker's compensation claims), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 687 (1981); Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 720
(9th Cir.) (policemen), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 510 (1981); Taylor v. Brighton Corp.,
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In reliance on a broad interpretation of the Griffin decision, courts
requiring class-based discrimination under clause one engaged in a
two-step analysis to extend the scope of Griffin's holding. For example, in Kimble v. D.J. McDuffyj, Inc., 32 the Fifth Circuit construed
the Court's discussion of the legislative history, and accordingly the
equal protection limitation, as pertaining to section 1985 in its entirety, not just to one subsection. 33 The court then read Griffin as
imposing an animus requirement on all section 1985(3) actions, including the voting provision, which lacks equal protection language. 34 Because the design of section 1985(3) is similar to that of
616 F.2d 256, 266 (6th Cir. 1980) (union members): Carchman v. Korman Corp.,
594 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir.) (tenant organizers), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898 (1979);
Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605, 608 (10th Cir. 1979) (debtors); Blevins v.
Ford, 572 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1978) (nonlawyers); Bova %-.Pipefitters &
Plumbers Local 60, 554 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1977) (nonunion employees); Morgan
v. Odem Co., 552 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1977) (newcomers to parish); McLellan v.
Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 932-33 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc)
(debtors); Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1975) (legal
aliens and citizens); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1232-33 (1st Cir. 1972) (physicians who had testified in malpractice suits), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973);
Cartolano v. Tyrrell, 421 F. Supp. 526, 532 (N.D. I11.
1976) (fireworks manufacturers); Arnold v. Tiffany, 359 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (C.D. Cal.) (newspaper distributors), aff'd, 487 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974); see
Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189, 1192 n.1 (7th Cir. 1976)
(dictum) (nonunion employees). Some liberal courts, however, have been satisfied if
the plaintiff is merely associated with some identifiable group. E.g., Azar v. Conley,
456 F.2d 1382, 1386 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1972) (dictum) (middle-class white family);
Harrison v. Brooks, 519 F.2d 1358, 1359-60 (ist Cir. 1971) (residential property
owners); Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224, 230 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (nonunion workers
and their employers), modified on other grounds, 640 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1981);
Seizer v. Berkowitz, 459 F. Supp. 347, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (professors who cooperate with the CIA); Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987, 997 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (employees prevented from asserting worker's compensation claims in state courts); Local No.
1 (ACA) v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 263, 277 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(local unions); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 386 F. Supp. 341, 348 (W.D. Pa. 1974)
(persons advocating the rights of a racial or class-based group); Brown v. Villanova
Univ., 378 F. Supp. 342, 344-45 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (demonstrators); Francesehina v.
Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833, 837-38 (S.D. Ind. 1972) (furnishers of information and
services to migrant workers in agricultural labor camps). For a summary of lower
court interpretations of the Griffin class-based animus requirement, see Class-Based
Animus, supra note 10, at 642-53; Private Conspiracies,supra note 11, at 1728 &
nn.45-47.
32. 648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 687 (1981).
33. Id. at 345-47; accordJones v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 168, 172-74 (E.D.
Ark. 1975), affd, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
34. 648 F.2d at 346-47; accord Jones v. United States. 401 F. Supp. 168, 174
(E.D. Ark. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977). Other courts have stated that discriminator), animus is not a requirement
under those clauses of § 1985 lacking equal protection language. E.g., Stern v.
United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1340-42 (7th Cir.) (§ 1985(1)), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977); Paynes v. Lee, 377 F.2d 61, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1967)
(dictum) (voting provision of § 1985(3)). Contra Means v.Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 840
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section 1985(2), 35 the court reasoned that a discriminatory animus
requirement could also be imposed on clause one of subsection 2, even
absent an express equal protection requirement. 36
Reliance on Griffin to find discriminatory animus applicable to
clause one, however, is misplaced. 37 Such an analysis ignores both
the plain meaning of the statutory language of subsection 2 and the
objective of the forty-second Congress when it enacted that portion of
the Ku Klux Klan Act.
II.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION

1985(2)

A. The Language
It is an oft-stated maxim that an analysis of statutory law must
begin with the language of the statute itself.35 A superficial examination of the syntax of section 1985(2) reveals that there are two basic
clauses separated by a semicolon. 3 The presence of the two clauses
(8th Cir. 1975) (discriminatory animus required under voting provision of § 1985(3)),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
35. 648 F.2d at 346-47. In Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Tex. 1978),
however, the court drew a distinction between the degree of equal protection denial
required under § 1985(3) and that required in an action under clause two of §
1985(2). Id. at 995-97. Whereas the second clause of § 1985(2) prohibits only conspiracies undertaken to obstruct the due course of justice in state courts, the first clause of
§ 1985(3) broadly prohibits any conspiracy to deprive persons of equal protection of
the laws. Id. at 995-96. Because the denial of equal protection in § 1985(2) is limited
to *the state court system, an area of particular congressional concern, the district
court found that the discriminatory animus required under clause two should be less
stringent. Id. at 996-97. Conversely, in § 1985(3), when no particular congressional
interest is involved, the class-based animus should be based on some immutable trait,
such as race or sex. Id. The court analogized this distinction to the traditional twotiered test under the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. Id. at 996.
When no particular fundamental right is threatened, discrimination against a suspect
classification is required to invalidate a law. Id. When a fundamental right is
implicated, however, all discrimination, whether or not against a traditionally suspect class, is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 996-97 (citing San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)). The analysis by the Britt court
poses some problems because the right to sue in state court is not a fundamental right,
see id. at 996-97, 997 n.17, and the "language requiring intent to deprive of equal
protection," Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (emphasis in original),
is similar in both § 1985(3) and (2). See 42 U.S.C. § .1985(2), (3) (Supp. III 1979),
quoted supra notes 8-9.
36. 648 F.2d at 346-47.
37. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 350 (5th Cir.) (en banc)
(Johnson, J., dissenting and concurring), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981); see
Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
38. E.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 197 (1976); Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Zerilli v. Evening News Ass'n, 628 F.2d 217, 220
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (Supp. III 1979), quoted supra note 8.
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together in a separate subsection indicates a common theme-the
subsection deals overall with interferences with judicial proceedings. 40 The first clause creates four distinct causes of action pertaining to interference with federal court proceedings. 41 The second42
creates two causes of action for obstruction of justice in state courts.
The language of the two clauses differs in that the second contains
"equal protection" language as an element of both causes of action
while the first includes no such requirement. 43 As a matter of statutory construction, "where Congress . . . has carefully employed a
term in one place and excluded it in another it should not be implied
45
where excluded." 44 Additionally, both the use of semicolons to di40. Id.
41. Id.; see Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 269, 274 (E.D. La.
1978), aff'd en banc, 648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981); see,
e.g., Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1981)
(conspiracy to deter witnesses and parties from attending or testifying); Kimble v.
D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir.) (en bane) (conspiracy to injure
party on account of having attended or testified), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981);
McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (conspiracy to influence the
verdict of a juror), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981); Brawer v. Horowtiz, 535 F.2d
830, 832-33 (3d Cir. 1976) (same); Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269, 269-70 (8th
Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Local No. 1 (ACA) v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 263, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (conspiracy to
injure party on account of having attended or testified); Kelly v. Foreman, 384 F.
Supp. 1352, 1353 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (conspiracy to influence verdict of a juror);
Pennsylvania v. Local Union No. 542, 347 F. Supp. 268. 271-72, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(conspiracy to deter party from attending or testifying). No case has been uncovered
dealing with a conspiracy to injure a juror on account of a verdict, presentment or
indictment.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (Supp. III 1979), quoted supra note 8; see Kimble v.D.J.
McDuffy, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 269, 274 (E.D. La. 1978), aJJ'd en bane, 648 F.2d 340
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981); see, e.g., Phillips v. International
Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 556 F.2d 939, 940-41 (9th
Cir. 1977) (conspiracy to obstruct justice in a state court); Seeley v. Brotherhood of
Painters, Decorators & Paper Hangers, 308 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962) (conspiracy to
injure a person for attempting to enforce the equal protection of the laws); Bergman
v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287, 294-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (conspiracy to obstruct justice in
a state court); Crawford v. City of Houston, 386 F. Supp. 187, 192 (S.D. Tex. 1974)
(conspiracy to injure a person for attempting to enforce the equal protection of the
laws).
43. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 350 n.1 (5th Cir.) (en bane)
(Johnson, J., dissenting & concurring), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 687 (1981).
44. Marshall v. Western Union Tel. Co., 621 F.2d 1246, 1251 (3d Cir. 1980);
accord Bott v. American Hydrocarbon Corp., 458 F.2d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 1972); J.
Ray McDermott & Co. v. Vessel Morning Star, 457 F.2d 815, 818 (5th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329
F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1964); Pennsylvania Agric. Coop. Mktg. Ass'n v. Ezra Martin
Co., 495 F. Supp. 565, 570 (M.D. Pa. 1980); see Feldman v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 408 F. Supp. 24, 34 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("all omissions should be taken as
exclusions, and this is especially so where other sections include the thing omitted").
45. The Supreme Court has stated that although matters such as punctuation are
not decisive of the construction of the statute, -'where they" reaffirm conclusions
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vide the two clauses of subsection 2, and the repetition of the disjunctive "or" 46 with the introductory language "if two or more persons"
beyond the semicolon, signify that each clause was meant to stand
alone as a separate and complete thought. 47 The implication of this
legislative design is that Congress intended the equal protection limitation in the second clause to refer to that clause only. 48
The independence of the two clauses is further illustrated by the
original organization of section 1985(2). The present wording derives
from section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, which was enacted as a
single, continuous paragraph with no subdivisions. 49 In the original
drawn from the words themselves they provide useful confirmation." United States v.
Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774 n.5 (1979); see 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 47.15, at 98 (4th ed. 1973). But see United States v.
Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 82-83 (1932) (punctuation is no part
of the law and will be disregarded when interpreting a statute); Hammock v. Loan &
Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77, 84-85 (1881) (same); Andrew Dossett Imp., Inc. v. United
States, 273 F. Supp. 908, 911 (Cust. Ct. 1967) (same).
46. Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1336 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977); cf. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1960)
(the normal grammatical significance of the disjunctive "or" is to give each of the
phrases set off by it independent effect).
47. Cf. Tyrrell v. Mayor of New York, 159 N.Y. 239, 241-43, 53 N.E. 1111, 111213 (1899) (where statute bifurcated by semicolon, language following semicolon does
not apply to language preceding semicolon).
48. See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 616-17 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 983 (1981); Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1340-41
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977).
49. Ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976 & Supp. III
1979)); see Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 346 (5th Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981); Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (E.D.
La. 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Robertson v. Wegmarm, 436 U.S. 584 (1978). Section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act
provided: "That if two or more persons within any State or Territory of the United
States shall conspire together to overthrow, or to put down, or to destroy by force the
government of the United States, or to levy war against the United States, or to
oppose by force the authority of the government of the United States, or by force,
intimidation, or threat to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the
United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States
contrary to the authority thereof, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent any
person from accepting or holding any office or trust or place of confidence under the
United States, or from discharging the duties thereof, or by force, intimidation, or
threat to induce any officer of the United States to leave any State, district, or place
where his duties as such officer might lawfully be performed, or to injure him in his
person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or to
injure his person while engaged in the lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or
to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the

discharge of his official duty, or by force, intimidation, or threat to deter any party
or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from
testifying in any matter pending in such court fully, freely, and truthfully, or to
injure any such party or witness in his person or propertyon account of his having so
attended or testified, or by force, intimidation, or threat to influence the verdict,
presentment, or indictment, of any juror or grand juror in any court of the United
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legislation, the two clauses of section 1985(2) were not even remotely
connected, but instead were separated by the lengthy first clause of
what is now subsection 3.50 Consequently, the equal protection language in clause two could not possibly have related back to clause one.
Moreover, section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act was logically as well as
structurally arranged into two parts: a federal portion and a nonfederal portion. 51 The first half of the original section 2 encompassed
States, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict,
presentment, or indictment lawfully assentedto by him, or on account of his being or
having been such juror, or shall conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public
highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State from giving or
securing to all persons within such State the equal protection of the laws, or shall
conspiretogetherfor the purpose of in any manner impeding, hindering, obstructing,
or defeating the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to
any citizen of the United States the due and equal protection of the laws, or to injure
any person in his person or his propertyfor lawfully enforcing the right of any person
or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws, or by force, intimidation, or
threat to prevent any citizen of the United States lawfully entitled to vote from giving
his support or advocacy in a lawful manner towards or in favor of the election of any
lawfully qualified person as an elector of President or Vice-President of the United
States, or as a member of the Congress of the United States, or to injure any such
citizen in his person or property on account of such support or advocacy, each and
every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high crime, and, upon conviction thereof in any district or circuit court of the United States or district or supreme
court of any Territory of the United States having jurisdiction of similar offenses,
shall be punished by a fine not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, as the court may determine, for a period of not less than six months nor more than six years, as the court
may determine, or by both such fine and imprisonment as the court shall determine.
And if any one or more persons engaged in any such conspiracy shall do, or cause to
be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby any person
shall be injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the persons so injured or deprived
of such rights and privileges may have and maintain an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation of rights and privileges against any
one or more of the persons engaged in such conspiracy, such action to be prosecuted
in the proper district or circuit court of the United States, with and subject to the
same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in
such courts under the provisions of the act of April ninth, eighteen hundred and sixtysix, entitled 'An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and
to furnish the means of their vindication."' Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat.
13-14 (1871) (emphasis added).
50. For the language of the original act, see supra note 49. Clause one is the first
italicized portion; clause two is the second italicized portion.
51. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), quoted supra note 49; see
PrivateActions, supra note 11, at 630-31. It should be noted that the voting provision
of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979), although it deals with a federal issue and
does not contain equal protection language, is located at the end of § 2 of the original
Act rather than with the other federal provisions. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 2, 17
Stat. 13 (1871), quoted supra note 49.
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section 1985(1) and the first clause of section 1985(2), both of which
deal with conspiracies aimed at obstructing federal institutions and
officers and lack equal protection language. 52 The latter half of the
original section 2 encompassed the second clause of section 1985(2)
and the first clause of section 1985(3), both of which proscribe conspiracies directed at non-federal institutions and contain equal protection language.53
As previously stated, courts requiring discriminatory animus as an
element of clause one actions reason that because Griffin can be read
as imposing an animus requirement on the voting provision of subsection 3, which lacks equal protection language, this requirement can be
similarly imposed on clause one of subsection 2.s Such an analysis,
however, is attenuated at best. In addition to misconstruing the Griffin opinion, 55 the syllogism utilized by these courts is valid only if the
two clauses of section 1985(2) can be interpreted as a common unit.
Yet, it is evident from the original Act that clauses one and two were
not enacted as a unit.-8 These clauses appear together solely because
of the reorganization of the Ku Klux Klan Act, 5 7 which occurred when
all federal laws were consolidated into the Revised Statutes of the
United States.5 8 At that time, section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act was
52. Ku Klux Klan Act ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), quoted supra note 49; see
Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 350 n.1 (5th Cir.) (en bane) (Johnson,
J., dissenting and concurring), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981).
53. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), quoted supra note 49; see
Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 350 n.1 (5th Cir.) (en bane) (Johnson,
J., dissenting & concurring), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981).
54. Kimble v. D.J. MeDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 346-47 (5th Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981); Jones v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 168, 174
(E.D. Ark. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977). The Kimble court further stated that the Supreme Court had not conducted a
"'hypertechnical analysis of the structure and grammar" of § 1985(3) to conclude that
racial or class-based animus was required under that section. Rather, the Court had
examined the overall purpose of Congress. 648 F.2d at 347. Clearly, a "hypertechnical analysis" of § 1985(3) was unnecessary in Griffin as equal protection language
expressly appeared in the clause at issue. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979),
quoted supra note 9.
55. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F,2d 340, 351-52 (5th Cir.) (en bane)
(Johnson, J., dissenting & concurring), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981). The
Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), was merely interpreting the
meaning of the equal protection language in clause one of § 1985(3), when they held:
"The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges
and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or ...

class-based, invidi-

ously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Id. at 102 (emphasis in
original).
56. See Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. [3 (1871), quoted supra note 49;
Private Actions, supra note 11, at 630.
57. See Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 837-39 (3d
Cir. 1976).
58. See An Act to provide for the Revision and Consolidation of the Statute Laws
of the United States, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74 (1866). Congress subsequently provided for

1982]

OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE IN FEDERAL COURTS

1223

reorganized into section 1980 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States 59 with the current three subsections and only minor grammatical changes. 60 The reorganization was clearly not intended to make
any substantive changes in the meaning of the original Act.A' In fact,
Congress expressly provided that any conflict between the revised

statute and the original Act must be resolved in favor of the original
language.62 The initial framework of section 1985 is persuasive evi-

dence that Congress intended the equal protection requirement to
limit the statute's application to conspiracies involving state court
proceedings, but as to conspiracies to interfere with the federal judi63
cial system, no such limitation was desired.
the consolidation and publication of all statutes in effect on December 1, 1873 into
the Revised Statutes of the United States. Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 333, 18 Stat. 113.
59. U.S. Rev. Stat. tit. 24, § 1980, [18 pt. 1] Stat. 347 (2d ed. 1878); see Kimble v.
D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 344-45 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 687 (1981). Section 1980 of the Revised Statutes consolidated both the Conspiracy
Act of 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284, and the Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13
(1871). Kimble v. D.J. MeDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 344, 345 n.6 (5th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 687 (1981); see U.S. Rev. Stat. tit. 24, § 1980, [18
pt.1] Stat. 347 (2d ed. 1878).
60. See Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 838 (3rd Cir. 1976). It is clear that the
consolidation resulted in no substantive change in language. Id. Compare 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (Supp. III 1979), quoted supra notes 7-9, with Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 2,
17 Stat. 13 (1871), quoted supra note 49.
61. When construing the Revised Statutes, "itis to be presumed that [Congress]
intended to transfer the sense" of the original laws. Pott v. Arthur, 104 U.S. 735, 736
(1881), quoted in Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 345 n.6 (5th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 687 (1981); accord Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830,
838 n.16 (3d Cir. 1976).
62. Act of Mar. 9, 1878, ch. 26, 20 Stat. 27, construed in Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy,
Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 345 n.6 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 687 (1981).
63. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615-17 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 983 (1981); Private Actions, supra note 11, at 630-31; see Brawer v. Horowitz,
535 F.2d 830, 837-40 (3d Cir. 1976). A broad reading of § 1985(2) is further
supported by the oft-quoted Supreme Court pronouncements that Reconstruction
civil rights acts are to be "accord[ed] a sweep as broad as [their] language." Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,
801 (1966)), quoted in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590 (1978); accord
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968). In introducing the bill,
Representative Shellabarger, Chairman of the House Select Committee that drafted
the Ku Klux Klan Act, stated: "This act is remedial ....

[T]he largest latitude

consistent with the words employed [should be] given in construing such statutes and
constitutional provisions ...... Cong. Globe, supra note 3, app. at 68. There is
widespread agreement that civil rights acts should be liberally construed so as to
carry out fully their beneficial objectives. E.g., Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S.
306, 313-14 (1964) (construing Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a
(1976)); Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir 1968) (same);
Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672, 676 (2d Cir. 1966) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976)); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697, 702 (3d Cir. 1949) (construing 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1976)). Correlatively, exceptions and limitations restricting the operation of
such statutes are to be strictly construed. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969).
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B. The Legislative History
The function of the equal protection langauge in the Ku Klux Klan
Act becomes clear when examined in light of the concerns plaguing
the forty-second Congress in 1871. The Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 4 when analyzing the legislative history of section 1985(3),
emphasized the desire of the forty-second Congress to prevent discriminatory animus against classes of people and to limit the coverage of
the broader provisions to conspiracies undertaken with that intent. 5
Courts requiring animus under clause one of section 1985(2) have
concluded that all of section 1985 evinces the same purpose and thus
all provisions should be limited to equal protection denials. 0
The essential purpose of section 1985(2), however, was to ensure
the effective operation of the state and federal judiciary, 7 as well as to
provide an unhindered avenue of redress to those injured by Klan
conspiracies.68 To effectuate these goals within the federal court
system, discriminatory intent was neither necessary nor desirable.09
That Congress's goal in passing the Ku Klux Klan Act was not solely
to safeguard the rights of the newly freed blacks, but also to maintain
the authority of the federal government, is evidenced by the political
and social climate in which the Act was passed. Furthermore, the
congressional debates preceding the amendment of the originally proposed bill illustrate that not every clause, particularly not the first
clause of section 1985(2), was intended to be limited by equal protection language.
1. Historical Background: The Genesis of the Ku Klux Klan Act
Following the Civil War, the Ku Klux Klan conspired to disrupt
governmental operations by intimidation and terrorism . 7 Although
racial violence was the most evident manifestation of Klan philoso-

64. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
65. Id. at 99-101.
66. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
67. Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981);

McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983
(1981); see Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 839 (3d Cir. 1976); 1 Civil Rights 591
(B. Schwartz ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Civil Rights].

68. See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 983 (1981); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 839 (3d Cir. 1976); see Civil
Rights, supra note 67, at 591.
69. See Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981);
McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 983
(1981); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir. 1976).

70. Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977); J. Randall & D. Donald, supra note 1, at 683; Original
Purpose, supra note 4, at ,109; see McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981); A. McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 686, 689.
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phy,"' its ultimate objective was to sabotage the Reconstruction policy
of Congress. 72 Murders, assaults, rapes, arson and other acts of violence committed by the Klan were frequently reported.7 3 The Klan's
system of protecting its members through secrecy and perjury on the
witness stand, however, was a nearly insurmountable prosecutorial
obstacle.74 Moreover, state and local governments were unable or
75
unwilling to quell the violence.

In March of 1871, President Grant asked for legislation giving him
authority to control the increasing chaos in the southern states.70 In
response, Representative Shellabarger of Ohio sponsored the Ku Klux
Klan bill, 77 which was officially entitled "An Act to enforce the Provi71. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425 (1973); McCord v.
Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981); Cong.
Globe, supra note 3, at 374 (statement of Rep. Lowe); id. at 428 (statement of Rep.
Beatty); J. Randall & D. Donald, supra note 1, at 683.
72. OriginalPurpose, supra note 4, at 404-05; see Stern v. United States Gypsum,
Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977); A.
McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 686, 689; J. Randall & D. Donald, supra note 1, at
683; see, e.g., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, app. at 195 (statement of Rep. Buckley)
("[the Klan] seeks to strike down your reconstruction laws"); id. app. at 201 (statement of Rep. Snyder) (the Klan's objective is the "overthrow of the whole system of
reconstruction").
73. E.g., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 248 (statement of Rep. Hoar); id. at 32021 (statement of Rep. Stoughton); id. at 369 (statement of Rep. Monroe); id. at 374
(statement of Rep. Lowe); id. at 428 (statement of Rep. Beatty); id. at 436 (statement
of Rep. Cobb).
74. H.R. Rep. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. xxx-xxxi, reprinted in Civil Rights,
supra note 67, at 599-600; cf. M. Berger, Equality by Statute 9 (rev. ed. 1967) (few
convictions under the "enforcement acts" due to difficulty of proving conspiracy and
intent, and to lack of sympathy of the predominantly white juries and judges toward
testimony by blacks).
75. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 426 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 174 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978); Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d
1329, 1334 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977); McLellan v. Mississippi
Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 932 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc). "That the state
courts. . . have been unable to enforce the criminal laws of their respective States or
to suppress the disorders. . . is a sufficient reason why Congress should.., enact the
laws necessary for the protection of citizens of the United States." Cong. Globe,
supra note 3, at 653 (statement of Sen. Osborn); accord id. at 334 (statement of Rep.
Hoar); id. app. at 179 (statement of Rep. Voorhees); id. app. at 226 (statement of
Sen. Boreman); id. app. at 315 (statement of Rep. Burchard); see M. Konvitz, A
Century of Civil Rights (1961) [hereinafter cited as M. Konvitz I].
76. Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 244 (statement of President Grant); see District
of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 426 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 17273 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
77. Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 317 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); see
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 426 (1973). The Ku Klux Klan Act was
the third of a series of "enforcement acts" designed by Congress to outlaw the Klan
and other vigilante organizations. The first two "enforcement acts" proscribed interferences with the voter and the polls in enforcement of the fifteenth amendment.
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sions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and for other purposes."' 78 The bill provided penalties for
conspiracies to overthrow the United States government, to prevent
the execution of the laws, or to deprive persons of their rights under
the laws or Constitution of the United States."' Under extreme circumstances, "the acts of conspirators were declared tantamount to
rebellion" and the President was authorized to suspend the habeas
corpus privilege and use military force. 80
The floor debates on the Ku Klux Klan Act discussed at length the
state of "anarchy" caused by Klan tactics and the consequent disruption to governmental operations. 8 ' Concern was expressed that Republican voters were being terrorized at the polls in order to ensure a
Democratic victory." - Moreover, acts of violence toward federal officials were becoming commonplace. 83 Several revenue officers and
United States mail agents had been murdered or driven from their
posts.8 4

Republican officials, such as United States Senators and

Civil Rights Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1976)); Civil Rights Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (repealed
1909); see A. McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 687; J. Randall & D. Donald, supra note

1, at 683; Frank & Munro, The Original Understandingof "Equal Protectionof the
Laws," 50 Colum. L. Rev. 131, 163 (1950). For a discussion of why the "enforcement
acts" and the Reconstruction measures were, in general, ineffective, see M. Berger,
supra note 74, at 8-9, 12-13; M. Konvitz, The Constitution and Civil Rights 103-06
(1947) [hereinafter cited as M. Konvitz II].
78. H.R. 320, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 317 (1871).
79. Id.; see 1 T. Emerson & D. Haber, supra note 4, at 19; J. Randall & D.
Donald, supra note 1, at 683-84; Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legislation, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1323, 1334 (1952).
80. H.R. 320, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 317 (1871); see 1
T. Emerson & D. Haber, supra note 4, at 19; J. Randall & D. Donald, supra note 1,
at 683-84; Gressman, supra note 79, at 1334.
81. E.g., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 245-48 (floor debate); id. at 320-21
(statement of Rep. Stoughton); id. at 369 (statement of Rep. Monroe); id. at 374
(statement of Rep. Lowe); id. at 428 (statement of Rep. Beatty); id. at 437 (statement
of Rep. Cobb); id. at 518 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 830 (statement of
Rep. Stewart). The South was characterized as being in a "condition of war." Id. at
339 (statement of Rep. Kelly). Representative Buckley warned that the spirit of
terrorism existing in the South "still defies the national authority, sets at naught the
laws of the country, and tramples upon the natural and political rights of our fellow
citizens." Id. app. at 190; see McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981).
82. E.g., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 321 (statement of Rep. Stoughton) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 345 (1871)); id.at 517 (statement of Rep.
Shellabarger); id. at 654 (statement of Sen. Osborn); see OriginalPurpose,supra note
4, at 409-10.
83. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 247 (statement of Rep. Kelley); id. at
248 (statement of Rep. Buckley); id. at 321 (statement of Rep. Stoughton); id. at 654
(statement of Sen. Osborn).
84. E.g., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 247-48 (statement of Rep. Kelley); id. at
519 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
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federal court clerks, had been attacked or assassinated.8" Additionally, Congress was concerned that concerted attempts to undermine
federal and state judicial systems were being effectuated by perjury,
concealment
of evidence and intimidation of witnesses, parties or
6
8

jurors.

Against this backdrop, it becomes apparent that the Klan was
primarily a political organization and a threat to federal authority."
Moreover, the Republican majority that eventually passed the Act was
well aware that the Klan was endeavoring to weaken the power base
of Republican state governments and place control in the hands of the
Democrats. 8 Significantly, therefore, the Ku Klux Klan Act was
enacted not just to deter discrimination but also "for other purposes"--to quash the Klan and restore political authority. 9
This is not to suggest that Congress was not desirous of safeguarding
the rights of the newly freed slaves; it was keenly aware that the Klan
85. Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 654 (statement of Sen. Osborn): id.app. at 200
(statement of Sen. Nye).
86. H.R. Rep. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. xxx-xxxi, reprinted in Civil Rights,
supra note 67, at 599-600; Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 653 (statement of Sen.
Osborn); see McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 983 (1981); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 839 (3d Cir. 1976). "'The
arresting power is fettered, the witnesses are silenced, the courts are impotent, the
laws are annulled, the criminal goes free, the persecuted citizen looks in vain for
redress."' Civil Rights, supra note 67, at 618 (quoting congressional hearings).
87. OriginalPurpose,supra note 4, at 403, 409. The contemporary Klan is generally classified as a racist organization. Id. at 403: see H.R. Rep. No. 648, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1967) (reprint of the House Un-American Activities Committee concerning the Ku Klux Klan and other organized conspiracies).
88. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 320-22 (statement of Rep. Stoughton);
id. at 333 (statement of Rep. Hoar): id. at 412-13 (statement of Rep. Roberts); id. at
443 (statement of Rep. Butler); id. at 484 (statement of Rep. Vilson); id. at 487
(statement of Rep. Tyner); id. at 653-54 (statement of Sen. Osborn); id. at 702
(statement of Rep. Edmunds); id. app. at 72 (statement of Rep. Blair): id.app. at 78
(statement of Rep. Perry); id. app. at 196 (statement of Rep. Snyder); id. app. at 252
(statement of Sen. Morton); see also Original Purpose,supra note 4, at 409-11, 41920. By 1871, Congress was so concerned about Klan violence and its political overtones that it appointed a joint committee to investigate the Klan. H.R. Rep. No.1,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. xxx-xxxi, reprinted in Civil Rights, supra note 67, at 599-600.
The Senate Select Committee to Investigate Alleged Outrages in the Southern States
concluded: that the Ku Klux Klan organization does exist and has a political purpose;
that murders, whippings, intimidation and violence are methods used to accomplish
its purpose; and that secrecy and perjury on the witness stand and in the jury box are
techniques utilized to protect its members from conviction and punishment. Id.,
reprinted in Civil Rights, supra note 67, at 599-600.
89. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
983 (1981); Original Purpose, supra note 4, at 403; see Rutledge v.Arizona Bd. of
Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (clause one of § 1985(2) designed to
protect the federal government's interest in its courts); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d
830, 839 (3d Cir. 1976) (debates on the Ku Klux Klan Act "bespeak a Congressional
intent to insulate witnesses, parties and . . . jurors from conspiracies to pressure or
intimidate them").
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targeted blacks and Union sympathizers90 and that state laws were not
being enforced with an equal hand. 9 ' Thus, in conjunction with the
intent to preserve orderly government, Congress sought to prohibit
concerted discriminatory conduct. 92 Although the Supreme Court in
Griffin v. Breckenridge9 3 focused on the latter objective in its analysis
of the legislative history, 94 that objective clearly was not the sole force
behind the Act.
The problems facing Congress in 1871 threatened many aspects of
federal authority, 5 and the Ku Klux Klan bill, as originally proposed,
was designed to give Congress sweeping power to remedy the situation.9 6 Section 2 of the original bill made it a federal crime to commit
murder, arson, assault, robbery or perjury, regardless of whether it
occurred in connection with a state or federal function or whether it
related to an intent to deny equal protection of the laws.91 Only after

90. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
91. E.g., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 459 (statement of Rep. Coburn); id. app.
at 153 (statement of Rep. Garfield); see McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.,
545 F.2d 919, 932 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
92. Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 412-13 (statement of Rep. Roberts); see M.
Konvitz I, supra note 75, at 63 (Reconstruction statutes sought to obtain equal
protection of the laws for blacks). For a discussion on why blacks gained little from
Reconstruction legislation, see M. Berger, supra note 74, at 8-9, 12-13; M. Konvitz
II, supra note 77, at 103-06.
93. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
94. Id. at 99-101.
95. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
96. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
983 (1981).
97. H.R. 320, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 317 (1871); see
McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615-16 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983
(1981). Section 2 of the original bill provided: "That if two or more persons shall,
within the limits of any State, band, conspire, or combine together to do any act in
violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of any person, to which he is entitled
under the Constitution and laws of the United States, which, committed within a
place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, would, under any
law of the United States then in force, constitute the crime of either murder,
manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury, subordination of
perjury, criminal obstruction of legal, process or resistance of officers in discharge of
official duty, arson, or larceny, and if one or more of the parties to said conspiracy or
combination shall do any act to effect the object thereof, all the parties to or engaged
in said conspiracy or combination, whether principals or accessories, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be liable to a penalty of not
exceeding $10,000, or to imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both, at the
discretion of the court; provided, that if any party or parties to such conspiracy or
combination shall, in furtherance of such common design, commit the crime of
murder, such party or parties so guilty shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer death;
and provided also, that any offense punishable under this act, begun in one judicial
district of the United States and completed in another, may be dealt with, inquired
of, tried, determined, and punished in either district. H.R. 320, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.,
Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 317 (1871).
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this broad remedy was attacked as exceeding congressional authority
was the equal protection language attached to the more controversial
provisions. 9 8 Evidently, Congress intended to reach attacks on governmental operations to the extent the Constitution permitted."'
The Griffin Court was correct in finding that clause one of section
1985(3) was intended to prevent "invidiously discriminatory animus"
against classes of people; the language and history plainly admit of
this interpretation. It is extremely doubtful, however, that the unnecessary burden of proving discriminatory animus would have been
imposed on a plaintiff whose right to a fair trial in federal court had
been violated. 100
2. Historical Background: The State Sovereignty Issue
Both Representatives and Senators of the forty-second Congress
seriously questioned whether the federal government could legislate
with regard to common-law crimes traditionally under state jurisdiction. 10 ' The extensive debates on this issue' 02 are perhaps the most
illustrative for interpreting section 1985(2), because they explain the
rationale for the strategic placement of equal protection language in
98. See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 616-17 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 983 (1981); infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
99. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
983 (1981).
100. Significantly, if the more specific provisions of § 1985(2) were drafted purely
to prevent equal protection denials, they would have been subsumed by the broader
provision of § 1985(3), explicitly proscribing equal protection denials of any kind. Cf.
Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1340 (7th Cir.) (similar argument adopted in rejecting an animus requirement for § 1985(1)), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 975 (1977). In speaking against imposing a discriminatory animus requirement
on § 1985(1) actions, the court in Stern pointed out that to do so would deprive §
1985(1) of its independent effect. Id. '[T]he effect of imposing the invidious animus
requirement on § 1985(1) would be to require a plaintiff to plead and prove a
complete § 1985(3) cause of action in his § 1985(1) lawsuit." Id. at 1340. Similarly,
requiring discriminatory animus in a § 1985(2), clause one action requires a plaintiff
to plead and prove a complete § 1985(3) cause of action. Cf. Griffin v.Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971) ("it is almost impossible to believe that Congress intended...
§ 1985(3). . .simply to duplicate [other statutes]"). It is also apparent that applying
the Griffin requirement to clause two of § 1985(2) brings it within the broader
language of § 1985(3). But see Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987, 995-96 (E.D. Tex.
1978) (imposing a less stringent discrimination requirement under § 1985(2), clause
two actions than that required under § 1985(3) actions).
101. See Jones v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 168, 173 (E.D. Ark. 1975), affd, 536
F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); see Frank & Munro,
supra note 77, at 164-65.
102. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 222 (statement of Sen. Thurman);
id. at 485 (statement of Rep. Cook); id. at 514 (statement of Rep. Poland); id. app. at
187 (statement of Rep. Willard); id. app. at 252 (statement of Sen. Morton); id. app.
at 313 (statement of Rep. Burchard); see Original Purpose, supra note 4, at 411-17
(comparing radical Republican view with moderate Republican view).
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the Act. The essence of the problem was the scope of congressional

power under the fourteenth amendment. 103 It was argued that to
render a "simple assault and battery" committed within a state actionable in federal court both exceeded this power and infringed on state
sovereignty. 104 The original expansive bill was criticized as giving "to

the United States courts jurisdiction of every criminal offense that
could be committed anywhere within the limits of the United States;
[thus] practically abolishing the criminal jurisdiction of the State,
absorbing it all into the United States courts."' 0 5

The Ku Klux Klan bill was amended in response to these objec-

tions. 0 6 Essentially, the new bill' 0 7 deleted the enumeration of spe-

cific felonies, added civil penalties'0 " and stated with greater specific-

ity the violations traditionally within federal jurisdiction, including
Jurisdiction over those
those pertaining to the judicial system.'10
such as obstruction of
authority,
state
under
offenses traditionally
justice in state courts, was limited to conduct committed with an
intent to deny equal protection of the laws.10 The drafters of the

new bill, however, did not attach equal protection language to those
provisions dealing with federal functions."' The debates demonstrate that Congress never questioned its authority to impose sanctions
for interfering with federal institutions." 2 For example, Senator

103. See Frank & Munro, supra note 77, at 164-65.
104. Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 485 (statement of Rep. Cook); see Hughes v.
Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6, 9-10 (4th Cir. 1972).
105. Cong. Globe, supra note 3, app. at 188 (statement of Rep. Willard); accord
id. at 337 (statement of Rep. Whitthorne); id. at 366 (statement of Rep. Arthur); id.
at 396 (statement of Rep. Rainey); id. at 514 (statement of Rep. Poland). The
subsequent addition of an equal protection denial requirement to traditional state
crimes apparently answered Representative Willard's objections, as he later announced that he would vote in favor of the bill. Id. app. at 188.
106. Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 477 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); see
McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983
(1981).
107. H.R. 320, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Globe, supra note 4, at 477 (1871).
108. Jones v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 168, 173 (E.D. Ark. 1975), aff'd, 536
F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). As first enacted, the Ku
Klux Klan Act provided both civil and criminal penalties. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
In the late nineteenth century, however, the Supreme Court found the criminal
provisions unconstitutional because, by prohibiting private conduct, they exceeded
the scope of the fourteenth amendment. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639
(1883).
109. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 983 (1981).
110. Id.; see Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 334 (statement of Rep. Hoar); id. at
477 (statement of Rep. Dawes); id. at 567 (statement of Sen. Edmunds); Frank &
Munro, supra note 77, at 166.
111. See H.R. 320, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 477 (1871).
112. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 983 (1981); accord Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1355
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Thurman, who questioned the logic of accepting traditionally state
cases into the United States courts, unhesitatingly agreed that conspiracies to interfere with the federal1 judicial
system should be under the
3
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Representative Cook, to illustrate the interest on which clause one
of section 1985(2) is grounded, differentiated that clause from other
parts of the bill." l4 He posited that a conspiracy to prevent a witness
from testifying in a federal court or to compel a false jury verdict in a
federal court was
an offense against the United States; for the simple reason ... that

it seeks to deprive a citizen of the United States of a right [guaranteed] by the Constitution of the United States .... If we have not

a right to legislate for the defense of every right secured by the
Constitution we have no authority to legislate for the security of
any right. That seems to be perfectly plain. 11 5
Because the federal government already had a constitutional interest
in protecting its own officials, courts and election processes, an equal
protection denial requirement was irrelevant to these provisions," 6
and one should not now be inferred.
Those maintaining that equal protection language is applicable to
clause one have quoted Representative Shenabarger's statement describing the amended bill to buttress their position: 7 "The object.of
the amendment is . .. to confine the authority of this law to the
prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights of
American citizens.""
Taking his statement out of context, they have
concluded that the Representative was referring to section 2 of the

(9th Cir. 1981) ("No constitutional doubt with respect to the power of the federal
government to protect [its judicial system] existed in 1871 nor does any exist today.").
113. Cong. Globe, supra note 3, app. at 220 (statement of Sen. Thurman). "I
grant that as to those which are offenses against the United States they must be taken
into the Federal courts; the State courts have no jurisdiction of them. For instance, to
intimidate a witness so as to prevent his attending upon a Federal court, to tamper
with a juror in a Federal court, are offenses, not against the State, but offenses the
jurisdiction of which must be given to the Federal courts ...... Id.
114. Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 486 (statement of Rep. Cook). Congressman
Cook was responsible for presenting to Congress the limiting amendment ultimately
adopted, id., and thus it may be assumed that he had knowledge of its intended
meaning.
115. Id.
116. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 687, 689 (1981) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d
1345, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615-17 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981).
117. Jones v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 168, 173 (E.D. Ark. 1975), afj'd, 536
F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Joint Memorandum of
Appellees at 5, McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
118. Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 478 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).

1232

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

original Act in its entirety."" The accompanying discussion, however, indicates that Representative Shellabarger's description of the
amendment's function refers only to that portion of section 2 to which
equal protection language was expressly attached. First, prior to making the above comment, he explained that the amendment was proposed to change only that part of section 2 which "relate[d] to disputed grounds, so far as it is not confined to infractions ...which are
clearly independent of the fourteenth amendment, referable to and
sustainable by the old provisions of the Constitution." 20 The portion
to be amended, according to the Representative, began at approximately line twenty-five of the original bill, just after the language that
would become clause one of subsection 2.121 Only then did he use the
language mentioned above describing the "object of the amendment." 21 2 This strongly suggests that Representative Shellabarger

was referring only to the object of adding the equal protection language to the provisions attacked as unconstitutionally infringing on
state sovereignty and requiring a federal nexus. Those provisions,
particularly the ones broadly covering state common-law crime, were

the focus of most of the debates concerning the amendment and were,

therefore, the ones which related to disputed grounds. 2 3 Clause one
of section 1985(2) was relatively noncontroversial 2 4 and is clearly
"sustainable by the old provisions of the Constitution." 125

119. Jones v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 168, 173 (E.D. Ark. 1975), afJ'd, 536
F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Joint Memorandum of
Appellees at 5, McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
120. Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 478 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
121. Id. Representative Shellabarger stated that the portion he was referring to
was "contained in the part beginning at line twenty-five, I think; I cannot state
exactly the place now," and then he began reading with "[t]o influence the verdict of
a juror in any Court of the United States," language which appears toward the end of
clause one. Id. It is probable that, because Representative Shellabarger had only 10
minutes to present his argument, id., he erred and intended to begin at clause two.
122. Id.
123. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180-81 (1961), overruled on other grounds,
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978); see supra notes 10110 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text. In Stern v. United States
Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977), the court
made the same argument with regard to § 1985(1). The court stated that the
reference to Representative Shellabarger's remarks concerning the modification of
the original Ku Klux Klan bill "merely explains the purpose of the amendment
offered, which substantially changed Section 2 by eliminating language that went a
long way towards establishing such a general federal role in enforcing state criminal
laws. . . . We fail to see how an explanation of the reasons for eliminating those
provisions sheds light on the meaning of the distinctly different and relatively noncontroversial provisions which remained in Section 2." Id. at 1337 (citations omitted).
125. Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 478 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); cf. Stern
v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1339, 1341 & n.18 (7th Cir.) (Rep.
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1985(2)

A. Constitutional Foundation
It is a basic constitutional principle that Congress's authority is that
of enumerated powers: Every congressional enactment must derive
from an explicit constitutional grant of authority. 2 6 The constitutional foundation for the first clause of section 1985(2) is Congress's
plenary power over the federal courts.12-7 Article I, section 8 grants
Congress the power "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court" 128 and to make any laws "necessary and proper" to effectively

constitute those tribunals.12 9 The Supreme Court has long stated that
Congress's implied powers under the "necessary and proper" clause
are to be liberally construed.13 0 In McCulloch v. Maryland,13' Chief
Justice Marshall stated that the reach of those powers is not limited to
such measures that are indispensably necessary; Congress may adopt
any means appropriate and plainly adapted to achieving its goal, as
long as those means are not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. 32 It cannot be doubted that punishing conspiracies to obstruct
the free and truthful flow of testimony, whatever their motivation or
adapted to the goal of maintaining
target, is appropriate and plainly
33
an effective judicial system.'
Congress's right to legislate with regard to its court system through
the "necessary and proper clause" can be analogized to its power,
under article I, section 4,134 to punish interferences with the right to
Shellabarger's comments introducing the amendment to the Ku Klux Klan bill evidence that the provisions independent of the fourteenth amendment-§§ 1985(1) and
(2)-were not to be limited by equal protection language), cert. denicd, 434 U.S. 975
(1977). In addition, Representative Shellabarger stated that those deprivations of
equal protection "shall be within the scope of the remedies of this section." Cong.
Globe, supra note 3, at 478 (Statement of Rep. Shellabarger). This further indicates
that the section made other remedies available.
126. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 676 (1978);
United Farm Workers v. Arizona Agric. Employee Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249,
1257 (9th Cir. 1982); Camacho v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 666 F.2d 1257, 1263 (9th Cir.
1982); Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987, 998 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
127. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 983 (1981).
128. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
129. Id. cl. 18.
130. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 159, 163, 4 Wheat. 315, 324-25 (1819);
accordBuckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 650-51 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966).
131. 17 U.S. 159, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
132. Id. at 163, 4 Wheat. at 324-25; accord Katzenbach v.Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
650 (1966); James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1924).
133. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 983 (1981); see Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1341
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 839
(3d Cir. 1976); Kelly v. Foreman, 384 F. Supp. 1352, 1354-55 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
134. U.S. Const., art. I, § 4.
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vote for federal officials, even if such conduct is not motivated by

racial discrimination. 3 As the Supreme Court stated in Ex Parte
Yarbrough,136 this power arises from the government's need to keep its
services free from the influences of force and fraud, and to ensure that
the officers chosen are the free and uncorrupted choice of their electors. 3 This inherent governmental "power of self-preservation" has
been extolled in a variety of other contexts.1 38 Certainly this power
can be used to prevent corruption of the judicial system.
Although the forty-second Congress explicitly drew on fourteenth
amendment powers when it enacted those provisions of section 1985
containing equal protection language, 39 the Supreme Court in Griffin
v. Breckenridge140 found other constitutional support for the statute.' 4' In Griffin, the Court deemed it unnecessary to find the first
part of section 1985(3) facially constitutional in all its possible applications. 42 Rather, the Court stated that a source of congressional
power can be located on a case-by-case basis. 43 Authority to reach
the particular injury in Griffin was found in the thirteenth amendment and the right to interstate travel. 44 The Court warned, how135. Fraenkel, The FederalCivil Rights Laws, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 301, 307 (1947);
see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) (Congress can regulate state
primary elections when they control the result of a federal election); James v.
Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 142 (1903) (Congress can punish bribery of elected federal
officials); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661 (1884) (Congress can legislate to
protect voters in federal elections from personal violence and intimidation and the
election itself from corruption); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 381-83 (1879)
(same).
136. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
137. Id. at 662.
138. E.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973) (Congress can restrict political activities by federal employees to ensure the fair operation of government); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S.
612, 625-26 (1954) (Congress can require the disclosure of federal lobbyists); United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947) (Congress can restrict political
activities by federal employees to ensure the fair operation of government); Stern v.
United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1338 (7th Cir.) (§ 1985(1) is constitutional as a derivation of the federal government's inherent power of self-protection),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977).
139. See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 932 (5th Cir.
1977) (en bane) ("the title of the bill itself, 'An Act to enforce the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

.

.

,'

demonstrates that the intent of the legislators was to

put force behind the Civil War Amendments"); Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987,
998 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (similar language).
140. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
141. Id. at 104-07.
142. Id. at 104.
143. Id.; see id. at 107. The Griffin decision involved a two-step analysis. The
Court considered whether the facts alleged fell within the terms of § 1985(3) as so
construed, id. at 96-103, and identified the constitutional source of power to reach
the conduct alleged. Id. at 104-07.
144. Id. at 104-06; see Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980) (§
1985 is derived from the thirteenth amendment). The commerce power has also been
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ever, that these sources of congressional power were not exclusive, and
given a different set of facts, other constitutional provisions could be
drawn upon. 45 In contrast to the clause at issue in Griffin, the
constitutionality of the first clause of section 1985(2) can be upheld in
all its possible applications
under article I, section 8, thus obviating a
146
case-by-case analysis.
identified as a source or congressional authority for § 1985(3). See Novotny v. Great
Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1255 (3rd Cir. 1978) (en banc), vacated
on other grounds and remanded, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
145. Id. at 107: see Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45, 48 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding
right to interstate travel source of congressional power for § 1985(3)).
146. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text. Significantly, it was not
equal protection language and a fourteenth amendment link that rendered the clause
in Griffin constitutional. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-06 (1971). Because the Supreme Court found that § 1985(3) reached private conspiracies, id. at
101, a finding that the section is constitutionally grounded on § 1 and § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment would have necessitated finding that the fourteenth amendment reaches private action. Although the Supreme Court has not yet answered this
question, Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987, 998 (E.D. Tex. 1978); Private Conspiracies, supra note 11, at 1722 n.11; see District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418,
423-24 & n.8 (1973), it has often indicated that the fourteenth amendment refers
exclusively to state action. E.g., Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 658, 661 (1951);
Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98
(1908); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.
629, 639-40 (1882); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875). Because
the thirteenth amendment and the right to interstate travel provided the constitutional authority to reach the private conduct alleged in Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105, the
Court reserved judgment on whether the fourteenth amendment alone could support
a statute proscribing private conduct. Id. at 107. As a result, there is presently a split
in the lower federal courts on whether § 1985(3) applies to private conspiracies that
only violate the fourteenth amendment. Compare Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech.,
524 F.2d 818, 828-29 (7th Cir. 1975) (§ 1985(3) does not reach private conspiracies
grounded on the fourteenth amendment alone), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976),
and Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504, 506-07 (4th Cir. 1974) (Congress
does not have the power to reach private conspiracies that violate the fourteenth
amendment alone), and Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972)
(some state involvement is required when a § 1985(3) suit is grounded solely on the
fourteenth amendment), with Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 637 F.2d 743, 748
(10th Cir. 1980) (read literally, § 1985(3) has nearly unlimited applicability to
private conspiracies designed to deprive plaintiffs of equal protection of the law),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 132 (1981), and Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673, 678 (7th
Cir. 1976) (absent state action, plaintiffs may use § 1985(3) if the), show a denial of
equal protection of the laws), and Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408 (2d
Cir. 1975) (no state action requirement under § 1985(3)), and Barnes v. Dorsey, 480
F.2d 1057, 1061 (8th Cir. 1973) (plaintiffs need not prove state action under § 1985
provided a denial of equal protection of the law is shown), and Action v. Cannon,

450 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1971) (§ 1985(3) applies to private conspiracies based
only on §§ 1 and 5 of the fourteenth amendment). The commentators are also divided
as to whether state action is required under the fourteenth amendment. Compare 3
C. Warren, Supreme Court in United States History 339 (1922) (fourteenth amendment guards against state action only), and OriginalPurpose,supra note 4, at 432 (§
1985(3) should only apply to conspiracies backed by state action, as the fourteenth
amendment covers only state action), with Gressman, supra note 79, at 1329-30
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B. Clause One Does Not Create
a General Federal Tort Law
Griffin v. Breckenridge147 and numerous lower federal courts have
reiterated the concern,1 48 originally expressed by the forty-second
(framers of the fourteenth amendment intended it to cover private action), and
Private Conspiracies, supra note 11, at 1729-31 (after Griffin, state action should
never be required for suits under § 1985(3)). Perhaps as a result of the state action
issue, the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge reserved judgment on whether §
1985(3) proscribes conspiracies motivated by discriminatory intent other than racial
bias. 403 U.S. at 102 n.9. By refusing to confer blanket authority for the statute
under the fourteenth amendment, the Court could go no further than the scope of
thirteenth amendment powers, see id., and the thirteenth amendment is limited to
racial bias. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). The result is to
effectively confine § 1985(3) actions to situations where a thirteenth amendment
right or a right of national citizenship, like travel, is at stake. This has relevance in
interpreting the reach of the second clause of § 1985(2). As Congress lacks authority
over the state court system equivalent to its power over the federal courts, clause one
cannot be supported by the same constitutional provision as clause two. McCord v.
Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981).
Because the forty-second Congress added the equal protection language to clause two
in order to ground it on the fourteenth amendment, conspiracies backed by state
action are clearly covered. See id.; Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987, 998 (E.D. Tex.
1978). Relying on the fourteenth amendment enforcement clause to proscribe private
conspiracies under clause two, however, remains problematic, just as it is under §
1985(3). There are two possible constitutional grounds for clause two of § 1985(2)
where state action is not alleged. If the fourteenth amendment is found to reach
private action, then clause two can also reach private conspiracies to obstruct justice
and can be constitutionally upheld on its face under § 1 and § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. Alternatively, if the fourteenth amendment is found not to reach private action, then another source of congressional power must be found on a case-bycase basis. Thus, the two-step analysis of Griffin will be applicable to § 1985(2),
clause two actions. See supra note 143. Where that source is the thirteenth amendment prohibition on slavery, racial discrimination will be required. Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). It is feasible, however, that state action will
be found due to the state's failure to prevent a conspiracy to obstruct justice in a state
court system. Cf.Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987, 1003 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (§ 5 of the
fourteenth amendment empowers Congress to proscribe private conspiracies to prevent the state itself from performing its constitutional duties). Apparently, some
members of the forty-second Congress felt that the state's failure to enforce its laws
constituted state action. See Cong. Globe, supra note 3, app. at 315 (statement of
Rep. Burchard) ("without a proper effort to discover, detect, and punish the violations of law and order, the State has not afforded to all its citizens the equal
protection of the laws"); id. at 334 (statement of Rep. Hoar) (similar language); id.
at 428 (statement of Rep. Beatty) (similar language); id. at 653 (statement of Sen.
Osborn) (similar language). The constitutionality of § 1985(2), clause two has apparently not arisen in the lower federal courts. But cf. Phillips v. International Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 556 F.2d 939, 941 n.1 (9th Cir.
1977) (for suit under clause two of § 1985(2), state action is not required); Mullarkey
v. Borglum, 323 F. Supp. 1218, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (same).
147. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). "That the statute was meant to reach private action does
not, however, mean that it was intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial
interferences with the rights of others . . . .The constitutional shoals that would lie
in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by
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Congress, that section 1985 could create a general federal tort law.1 49
Although Congress has authority to regulate conduct in the federal
courts,150 it has been argued that clause one, by proscribing traditional state torts, has the potential to transgress the federalist policies15 ' embodied in the tenth amendment. 52
Clause one, however, cannot expand into a general federal tort law
due to the inherent limitations of the federal court provisions.15 3 The
four causes of action created by clause one of section 1985(2) are quite
specific' s4 and have been strictly construed. To be actionable, a conspiracy 55 to deter parties or witnesses must be carried out by force,
giving full effect to the congressional purpose-by requiring... the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment."
Id. at 101-02.
148. E.g., Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 346-47 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 687 (1981); Jackson %.Cox, 540 F.2d 209, 210 (5th
Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6, 9-10 (4th Cir.
1972); Puentes v. Sullivan, 425 F. Supp. 249, 252 (\V.D. Tex. 1977); Brainerd v.
Potratz, 421 F. Supp. 836, 839 (N.D. Ill. 1976), affd mem., 566 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir.
1977); Western Telecasters, Inc. v. California Fed'n of Labor, 415 F. Supp. 30, 31
(S.D. Calif. 1976); Jones v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 168, 172 (E.D. Ark. 1975),
aff'd, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Phillips v.
Singletary, 350 F. Supp. 297, 302 (D.S.C. 1972).
149. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
151. See Taylor v. Nichols, 409 F. Supp. 927, 933 (D. Kan. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d
561 (10th Cir. 1977); Egan v. City of Aurora, 174 F. Supp. 794, 798 (N.D. I11.
1959),
aff'd, 275 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1960), modified on other grounds, 365 U.S. 514 (1961).
152. U.S. Const. amend. X; see Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 34546 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 687 (1981); Taylor v.Nichols, 409 F.
Supp. 927, 933 (D. Kan. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1977); Jones v. United
States, 401 F. Supp. 168, 172-73 (E.D. Ark. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Egan v. City of Aurora, 174 F. Supp. 794,
798 (N.D. IMI. 1959), affd, 275 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1960), modified on other grounds,
365 U.S. 514 (1961).
153. Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see
Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 502 (10th Cir. 19'79); Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp.
987, 995-96 (E.D. Tex. 1978). In contrast, an equal protection denial purpose is
required in clause two of § 1985(2) and clause one of § 1985(3) because the broad
coverage of those provisions potentially creates a general federal tort law. Rutledge v.
Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); Britt v. Suckle, 453 F.
Supp. 987, 996 (E.D. Tex. 1978); see Phillips v. International Ass'n of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 556 F.2d 939, 94041 (9th Cir. 1977).
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (Supp. III 1979), quoted supra note 8. Clause one
requires a conspiracy a) undertaken in a particular manner-by force, intimidation
or threat; b) directed only at particular persons-parties, witnesses or jurors; c) to
deter them from engaging in particular activities-attending, testifying or rendering
a verdict; or d) to injure them on account of their having engaged in those acti%ities.
Id.
155. The existence of a conspiracy is a sine qua non to a cause of action under any
part of § 1985. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); Dacey v.
Dorsey, 568 F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978); Serzysko v.
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intimidation, or threat. 15 Thus, it has been held that covert retaliatory conduct such as employment discrimination is not within the
scope of the Act. 15 7 Additionally, courts have held that the influence

over a juror must be direct or overt and not the mere withholding of
accurate information from the jury.,

8

Finally, the individual must

Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883
(1972); Croy v. Skinner, 410 F. Supp. 117, 126 (N.D. Ga. 1976). Some courts have
narrowly construed the conspiracy requirement by holding that a business entity,
when all defendants are employed therein, cannot conspire with itself. See, e.g.,
Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. University of
Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1370 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth
Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976). Contra Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1256-59 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 442 U.S. 366
(1979). For a discussion of this issue, see Note, IntracorporateConspiraciesUnder 42
U.S.C. § 1985(c), 92 Harv. L. Rev. 470 (1978). The existence of a conspiracy is a
factual question, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 176 (1970) (Black, J.,
concurring), but an allegation that two or more defendants agreed to perform the
proscribed act is generally sufficient. E.g., Crawford v. Houston, 386 F. Supp. 187,
192 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1974). Additionally, an overt act in futherance of the conspiracy
must be alleged under any subsection of § 1985. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III
1979), quoted supra notes 7-9; see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 103 (1971);
Kitchen v. Crawford, 326 F. Supp. 1255, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1970), affd per curlam,
442 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956 (1971).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (Supp. III 1979), quoted supra note 8.
157. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 348 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981). The plaintiff in Kimble alleged that he and other
members of a class of people who had filed personal injury or worker's compensation
claims in federal court had been blacklisted by employers to deter them from ever
filing suit against a company. Id. at 342-43. The Fifth Circuit held that covert
retaliatory conduct, such as employment discrimination, was not within the scope of
the phrase "to deter, by force, intimidation or threat" in § 1985(2). Id. at 343.
158. Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir. 1976). The Third Circuit
held a conspiracy to use perjured testimony and conceal exculpatory evidence does
not come within the ambit of the phrase "to influence the verdict... of a juror" in
subsection 2, because a more direct influence than the mere withholding of fully
accurate evidence is required. Id. That "by force, intimidation or threat" language is
absent where the clause speaks of influencing a juror was not considered crucial. Id.
Those words existed in the original version of the Act and were removed merely to
allow for more subtle inducements-such as money-but the inducement must still
be direct. Id. The court stated that although these five words are not contained, with
respect to influencing jurors, in the current § 1985(2), "we attach no talismanic
significance to this difference. Rather, we believe it wholly logical and reasonable
that, [in enacting the modern § 1985, the] commission deleted the words, recognizing
that juries can be 'influenced' as often ... by positive inducements-such as
money-as they can by negative inducements, including force, intimidation or
threats." Id.; accord Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 502 (10th Cir. 1979); cf.
Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287, 294-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (prejudicing future
judges and jurors against the plaintiff by publicizing adverse information about him
insufficient to state a claim under clause one). But see Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1336-37 (7th Cir.) (in § 1985(1), force, intimidation or
threat language does not modify the latter two clauses where such language is
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be deterred from attending or testifying, or injured on account of
having attended or testified, rather than having merely filed a
claim. 159 The paucity of cases that have arisen under clause one is a
further indication of the narrowness of its scope.'10 While the Griffin
Court expressed the fear of creating a general federal tort law, and
thus required discriminatory animus, it is important to note that it
was interpreting subsection 3, by far the most general provision of
section 1985.161
Moreover, permitting actions under clause one of section 1985(2)
absent proof of discriminatory animus does not federalize state tort

absent), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977); Kelly v. Foreman, 384 F. Supp. 1352,
1355 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (direct effect requirement not applied). Thus, the "direct
inducement" element announced in Brawer seems to require that the juror be aware
of the inducement and affirmatively change his verdict because of it.
159. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 348 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 687 (1981); see Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 502 (10th Cir.
1979). The Fifth Circuit in Kimble held the word "attended" was to be given its
ordinary dictionary meaning which is to "be present at." 648 F.2d at 348 (quoting
Webster's Third International Dictionary 140 (3d ed. 1961)). The statute, therefore,
only forbids interference with a party's right to physically attend or testify in federal
court. Id. The dissent argued that the majority's reading of § 1985(2), clause one is
too narrow and effectively precludes plaintiffs "at the outset from having the opportunity to testify." Id. at 354. Further, a party is present in federal court when his
attorney, as agent or substitute for the client, files a claim. Id. at 353-54 & n.4.
Moreover, even if the physical presence of the party were required, the party "attends" federal court upon delivering a complaint, attending a pre-trial conference,
temporary restraining order hearing, or other pre-trial activities. Id. at 354. The
majority's reasoning is also unpersuasive as the statute clearly forbids injury to a
party on account of his having already attended or testified-possibly long after his
physical attendance in court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (Supp. III 1979), quoted supra
note 8. Rather, if any limitation was intended, it is more likely that Congress only
desired to ensure a sufficient connection with the federal courts to render the statute
clearly constitutional. See Cong. Globe, supra note 3, at 486 (statement of Rep.
Cook) ("A citizen ... has a right to have his case tried within a United States Federal
court where that court has jurisdiction of the case.").
160. Research has uncovered only seven reported cases brought under clause one
of § 1985(2). Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981);
Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 687 (1981); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 983 (1981); Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976); Local No. 1
(ACA) v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Kelly
v. Foreman, 384 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979), quoted supra note 9. One commentator
has argued that the Griffin discriminatory animus requirement has proven insufficient to narrow the scope of § 1985(3) and, indeed, a general federal tort law is
developing. To forestall this, the commentator recommends that the statute should
be interpreted as imposing a state action requirement. OriginalPurpose, supra note
4, at 430.
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law because the interest at stake is purely federal. 6 2 The nexus
between the proscribed activites and the federal courts is sufficient to
justify the regulation.6 3 The clear and substantial federal interest in
maintaining an effective and just court system can be effectuated by
preventing conspiracies, regardless of their genesis, to interfere with
that system. The unhindered flow of claims, evidence and truthful
testimony is the foundation upon which an effective judiciary is built.
CONCLUSION

Section 1985 provides litigants with an important means of protecting their right to a fair trial in federal court, while insulating the
federal judiciary from conspiracies aimed at thwarting justice. It is
illogical to impose a discriminatory animus requirement on a provision that, aside from its location in a Reconstruction era statute, has
little to do with discrimination. Imposing such a limitation on this
action unjustifiably restricts its scope, and effectively negates its remedial purpose. The forty-second Congress, desirous of ending conspiracies to impede federal justice, would not have thus crippled clause
one's utility when there was no constitutional or practical reason to do
SO.
Moreover, the modern federal judiciary would certainly promote
fair and effective justice by deterring conspiracies to disrupt the system, regardless of their motivation. As conspiracies by their very
nature often go undetected, and the plaintiff is often the only one with
full knowledge of the crime, permitting civil suit may be the most
practical way to locate the wrongdoer and to deter future conspiracies.

Janet A. Barbiere
162. See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (clause one "does
not demand a denial of 'equal protection of the laws' . . . to avoid constitutional
shoals" (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981).
163. Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir. 1976).

